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vABSTRACT 
The research presented in this thesis provides the reader with a set of algorithms 
and techniques that enable the user to remotely determine what chipset and device driver 
an 802.11 device is using. The work details both passive and active approaches, and 
quantitatively gauges the effectiveness of various techniques. 
The implications of this are far ranging. On one hand, the techniques can be used 
to implement innovative new features in Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS). 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of wireless local area networks (WLAN) has exploded in recent 
years due in large part to standardization by the IEEE and certified WiFi interoperability; 
see the compilation Wireless LAN Edition [1].  Vendors ship products that they claim 
conform to the IEEE 802.11 standard and in many ways, they do, as the WiFi industry 
consortium can confirm.  Yet products can also vary widely in their implementations of 
this standard.  An implementation usually comprises a software component (the device 
driver) the hardware (radio chipset), and firmware for that chipset.  The combination of 
the three uniquely identifies the implementation.  Invariably, an implementation exhibits 
some behavior that can be observed or measured and is unique.  This behavior is called 
its 802.11 fingerprint.  Fingerprints enable us to identify 802.11 implementations. 
A. WHY FINGERPRINT 802.11? 
Some 802.11 implementations have vulnerabilities that make devices that use the 
wireless technology vulnerable as well.  Exploits developed for one implementation may 
not work for another so an attacker prefers to identify the implementation first.  Then 
they can choose the appropriate exploit rather than cycling through them and possibly 
drawing attention to themselves by crashing a device with the wrong exploit.   
Fingerprints can also be used in a defensive way.  A system administrator may 
maintain a database of authorized devices approved for use on their WLAN.  Typically 
the devices are identified by their globally-unique 802.11 MAC addresses.  But this is 
insufficient because a MAC address can be easily cloned by an authorized user using an 
unauthorized device.  A better approach is to use an 802.11 fingerprint.  Knowing which 
802.11 implementations are vulnerable, an administrator can monitor their environment 
for wireless activity, observe 802.11 fingerprints and be notified of an authorized user 
who is using a device with a vulnerable 802.11 implementation even if the device clones 
the 802.11 MAC address of an authorized, and presumably secure, implementation.  
There are a variety of monitoring products on the market today, generally called Wireless 
Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS), where 802.11 fingerprints could be observed. 
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This thesis describes three techniques for identifying a given 802.11 
implementation based on its fingerprint.  Two are active in that they require the 
implementation to participate in a portion of the 802.11 protocol. One active technique 
requires transmission of various control frames, and the other requires a special AP that 
crafts particular frames.  The third technique is passive in that it processes a snapshot of 
802.11 protocol traffic produced by the given implementation over a relatively short 
period of time. 
B. WHAT IS 802.11? 
802.11 is a link-layer protocol standard ratified by the IEEE. The first version of 
the standard was ratified in 1997 and the most recent revision was ratified in 1999 and 
reaffirmed in June 2003 [2]. Alternative data rates and PHY-layer protocols are specified 
in amendments 802.11b-1999 and 802.11a-1999 respectively.  The Wireless LAN Edition 
is a compilation of the standard and its amendments. Many people equate “Wi-Fi” with 
802.11. Wi-Fi is a term created by the Wi-Fi association [3]. It is quite possible for a 
device to be Wi-Fi compliant without fully complying with the 802.11 standard. 
IEEE Std 802.11 is a Media Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) 
standard governing wireless local area networks operating in the ISM band which is 
unlicensed radio spectrum. This required the 802.11 Task Group to deal with problems 
that have no simple analogy in the wired world. 
One of the most obvious problems is the unreliability of a wireless link. The 
standard operates in unlicensed spectrum and therefore competes with cordless phones 
and other wireless networks for the medium.  Different wireless networks using the same 
frequency must co-exist.  The designers had to take into account various means to stop 
independent networks from unfairly impacting the performance of each other. The 802.11 
standard includes features to address this problem. These include positive 
acknowledgement with retransmission, and special medium access control frames called 
Request To Send (RTS) and Clear To Send (CTS). 
Another major problem designers had to address is the vulnerability of a wireless 
link to eavesdroppers.  This prompted the designers to include Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP) as a first attempt at providing link layer privacy, integrity and access control.  One 
3could have argued that privacy is outside the scope of a wireless MAC-PHY standard.  
However, the designers recognized the need to make 802.11 implementations self 
contained so that they could be deployed without disrupting the wired networks they 
were attempting to extend.  Adoption of the technology would be hampered if it required 
other technologies, such as a Virtual Private Network, in order to be deployed.  But WEP 
failed on all three fronts [4]. Fortunately, the 802.11i Task Group had already begun 
augmenting WEP with a new authenticated encryption algorithm in 2001 when Fluhrer et 
al. announced their findings.  Nonetheless, it brought a new sense of urgency within the 
Task Group.  
Unlike wired Ethernet, the 802.11 MAC protocol includes connecting to a 
distribution system via an Access Point (AP). Access points have no idea what clients are 
within range of their signal unless clients tell them.  The 802.11 MAC includes a set of 
rules for discovering and connecting to an AP. In a wired network this is accomplished 
by plugging in a cable.  Typically, physical building security prevents anyone from being 
able to plug in a cable.  With an 802.11 wireless LAN, however, many clients may be 
constantly searching for wireless networks to join.  
In summary, the 802.11 standard is in many ways more complicated than its 
wired-Ethernet counterpart due to issues that arise in a wireless environment. It has to 
deal with many problems that have no wired-side analogy. Ultimately it is this 
complexity that leads implementations to vary, making fingerprinting possible. 
C. FINDING AN 802.11 FINGERPRINT 
An implementation comprises a driver, radio chipset, firmware, and possibly 
some user-space applications.  Ideally, one would be able to identify any component of a 
given implementation and further refine identification of each software component by its 
version.  Whether it is possible to identify these components depends largely upon 
behaviors not governed by the standard and where they are implemented.  As we shall 
see, there is even deviation from the standard within the industry that presents very useful 
opportunities for fingerprinting.  Developing 802.11 fingerprints is largely an exploratory 
exercise in determining how an 802.11 implementation behaves uniquely.   
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The strength of a fingerprint determines whether the components of an 
implementation can be identified individually.  The fingerprints described in this thesis 
afford reliable identification of 802.11 chipsets, drivers, and in some cases, different 
versions of the same driver.  No attempt was made to differentiate firmware versions.   
One of the most unique aspects of 802.11 implementation fingerprinting is that 
many characteristics of the implementation are controlled by hardware. However, there is 
a trend in modern 802.11 chipsets to push more and more functionality into software. 
Popular examples of these chipsets include products from Atheros and Ralink. Though it 
seems unlikely, it is quite possible that drivers for software based radio chipsets (such as 
products from Atheros and RaLink) could be patched, allowing them to mimic the details 
of other implementations. Doing this would allow an attacker to have his driver or chipset 
intentionally misidentified, perhaps to sidestep a fingerprint-aware WIDS.  
Many other devices however have certain aspects that cannot be controlled from 
software. The older Prism2 generation of chipsets is the best example of a chipset that 
operated somewhat independently of the driver. 
D. ACTIVE 802.11 IDENTIFICATION 
Active identification revolves around observing variations in the implementations 
of 802.11 association. As stated, two active techniques were investigated.  One technique 
involved observing an 802.11 implementation’s response to CTS packets attempting to 
use the virtual carrier sense mechanism of 802.11 to reserve the medium.  It did not do as 
well as the second active technique.  The second technique involves modifying packets 
that are exchanged in typical authentication/association response when a client associates 
with an AP.  Once the exchange has taken place the results can be categorized and looked 
up in a table. This technique requires an attempt by the 802.11 implementation being 
fingerprinted to associate with an AP that has been modified to craft special kinds of 
association and authentication reply frames.  The frames elicit different behaviors from 
the 802.11 implementations.  A fingerprint in this case is the behavior of an 802.11 
implementation in response to these special frames. 
 
 
5E. PASSIVE 802.11 IDENTIFICATION 
Passive identification is done via an off-line algorithm.  The algorithm takes as 
input a capture of 802.11 frames sent by the 802.11 implementation in question.  It 
compares certain characteristics of this capture to a database computed before hand, and 
returns what is the most likely implementation to generate such a capture. In particular, a 
technique that examines the duration field of 802.11 frames is explored.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into the following chapters. Chapter II provides a brief 
overview of the relevant portions of the IEEE 802.11 MAC rules. Chapter III discusses 
the active fingerprinting techniques that were developed, and Chapter IV covers the 
passive technique. Chapter V analyzes the accuracy of the passive technique.  Chapter VI 
contains future work and concluding remarks. Finally three appendices are also included: 
Appendix A lists the results for all matching metrics covered in Chapter IV. Appendix B 
covers implementation details that can be used to validate the techniques and results. 
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7II. OVERVIEW OF THE 802.11 MAC 
This chapter provides the relevant background of the 802.11 MAC needed to 
understand the fingerprinting algorithms covered in Chapter III.  This background is by 
no means a complete description of the 802.11 standard. 
A. 802.11 BASICS 
Standard 802.11-1999 specifies Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical 
(PHY) layer protocols.  There are two types of MAC protocols described, Point 
Coordination Function (PCF) and Distributed Coordinated Function (DCF).  It is possible 
to alternate between them.  When the PCF is operating, the medium is in a contention-
free period since the point coordinator, an access point, controls all access to the medium.  
When end stations compete for the medium, including the access point, they use the DCF 
MAC protocol.  This period is called a contention period.  
The standard specifies three different frame types: control, management, and data. 
Control frames are used for medium reservation and acknowledgements, and have a real-
time processing requirement. Medium reservation control frames are not confined to a 
single network; they are intended to be processed by all stations on a given channel even 
though they may belong to different wireless networks, or Basic Service Sets (BSS).  
These frames carry a duration field that is essentially an announcement of a station’s 
intention to use the medium for a period of time.  Stations operating on the same channel 
should observe the announcement regardless of the BSS to which they belong.  Otherwise 
they risk interference with their own transmissions.  In this way, multiple Basic Service 
Sets can coexist on the same channel.  
MAC management in 802.11 includes authentication and association with an 
access point. It also includes provisions for locating networks via probe requests and 
beacon packets.  Management frames handle all of these tasks.  






B. ASSOCIATION AND AUTHENTICATION  
One of the unique things about wireless networks is that there needs to be a 
protocol for connecting to a BSS or IBSS. IEEE Std 802.11-1997/1999 describes a 3-
state protocol that a client must engage in with the AP in a BSS before it is connected to, 
or in 802.11 terminology, associated with the BSS.  
A client initially starts out as un-authenticated and un-associated (state 1). The 
first thing it must do is authenticate to the AP. There are two types of authentication 
possible, open (no authentication) and shared-key. 802.1x based authentication (as 
specified in the 802.11i amendment) does not take place at this phase. Most AP's use 
open authentication; shared-key allows attackers to launch known plaintext attacks. 
Clients authenticate by sending an authentication request frame. The AP either responds 
with authentication successful, or a shared-key challenge. Once a client has authenticated 
it, enters state 2, authenticated and un-associated. 
Once a client is in state 2, it sends an association request frame. At this point, the 
AP replies with an association success. This places the client in state 3, authenticated and 
associated. At this point, the client can send data packets to the AP. If 802.1x 
authentication is to take place, it would happen now. Assuming 802.1x authentication 
doesn't happen, it takes four frames for a client to successfully associate with a BSS.   
Before a client can authenticate and associate with a BSS, it must locate the BSS.  
The 802.11 standard provides two techniques locating IBSS's/BSS's, probe requests and 
beacon packets. Beacons are packets that an AP sends out periodically, informing nearby 
stations of their presence.  Probe Requests are packets that allow clients to ask if there are 
any nearby AP's. These come in two flavors, broadcast and directed. Directed probe 
requests are used to locate a specific network, while broadcast probe requests are used to 
find any networks that happen to be nearby.1 
 
 
                                                 
1 A broadcast probe request is the only 802.11 broadcast MPDU an end station can transmit. 
9Curiously, the standard specifies client de-authentication whereby an access point 
can place the client in an unauthenticated state without having to authenticate itself to the 
client.  As a result, any station can put another end station into this state as a kind of 
denial-of-service attack.   
C. PHYSICAL AND VIRTUAL CARRIER SENSE  
The 802.11 standard specifies two ways to determine if the medium is busy. The 
first is a physical carrier sense. 802.11 specifies that any PHY must provide a technique 
to sense if the medium is busy. The function in the PHY layer responsible for this is 
called the clear channel assessment (CCA). 
Two clients that belong to the same BSS may not be within radio range of each 
other.  Therefore, neither will be able to detect energy on the medium necessary to do a 
CCA.  Further, it is more efficient in some cases for a client to reserve the medium in 
advance, for instance, for an acknowledgement which can be sent immediately upon 
receipt of a frame.  Both cases are handled using a virtual carrier sense mechanism.  It 
consists of a Network Allocation Vector (NAV) maintained by each client.  The NAV 
can be thought of as a client’s best guess as to how long the medium will be busy.  The 
client’s NAV is updated in response to receiving a frame whose duration field contains a 
value that exceeds the current NAV value. 
The duration field is found in nearly every packet.  It is not included in Power-
Save Poll frames, as the bits are used for the association ID field. Conceptually the 
duration field of a frame is the amount of time the transmitting client wishes to reserve 
the medium for itself to send subsequent frames, including any replies expected of the 
recipient such as acknowledgements.  How this value is computed depends on the exact 
type of frame it is in. The duration field is 16 bits. Therefore the largest value it could 
reserve the media for is 65,535 microseconds. However the standard explicitly says to 





In a typical scenario where a client is not sending an unfragmented data frame, the 
duration field will be the amount of time it takes for the inter-frame spacing, combined 
with the time required for the receiving station to send an ACK packet; in other words, a 
constant. In management types (such as beacons) or some control types (such as ACKs) 
no more traffic is needed, and the duration field is set to zero. 
In more complicated scenarios involving fragmentation, the duration field will 
include the time required not only for the inter-frame spacing and ACK, but for the rest 
of the fragments.  See RTS and CTS frames in the next section.  Finally an important 
aspect of the PCF is implemented by using the duration field to interoperate with stations 
on the same channel using the DCF. 
D. RTS/CTS CONTROL FRAMES 
The 802.11 MAC control frames include Request To Send (RTS) and Clear To 
Send (CTS).  These frames aim to reduce the number of bytes that need to be 
retransmitted due to interference at an AP from a client out of radio range from the 
sender, the so-called hidden node. 
The hidden node problem refers to the scenario where two wireless clients (nodes) 
are on opposite sides of the AP. Though the AP can hear both of the nodes, the nodes do 
not hear each other's transmissions. This can create a problem when both clients attempt 
to transmit at the same time because they sense the medium is free, resulting in a 
collision at the AP. 
RTS and CTS packets are there to help prevent these types of collisions from 
happening on sufficiently-large packets.  The value of 'sufficiently large' is left up to the 
device driver, and may be configurable by a user.  This value is called the RTS threshold. 
Assuming the client has a frame to send that surpasses the RTS threshold, it will 
first send a RTS frame to the AP. At this point, if the rules of the MAC allow it, the AP 
will respond with a CTS packet directed to the client.  The reason that the AP needs to 
send the CTS packet (instead of the client) is that everyone within range of the AP will 
receive it.  Of course an RTS can collide at the AP due to the hidden node but the cost of 
retransmitting it is much lower than that to retransmit the frame whose size exceeds the 
11
RTS threshold.  Thus the RTS/CTS exchange lowers the likelihood of a collision at the 
AP due to a hidden node and further, an RTS costs less to retransmit if there’s a collision.  
RTS and CTS frames also have a duration field.  The duration field of an RTS and 
CTS is long enough to reserve the medium for sending and acknowledging the frame that 
exceeds the RTS threshold.  If this frame has to be fragmented, then the duration is long 
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III. ACTIVE IDENTIFICATION  
Active identification relies on eliciting a fingerprint through executing some part 
of the 802.11 protocol with the implementation being identified. This chapter describes 
two approaches to active identification.  The first is based on eliciting unique responses 
to CTS frames. The second is based on eliciting responses to 802.11 association 
redirection attempts. 
A. RTS/CTS WINDOW HONORING 
As mentioned, one of the features included in the 802.11 standard is the use of 
Request To Send (RTS) and Clear To Send (CTS) packets to mitigate the hidden node 
problem. It is quite possible for 802.11 implementations to fail to implement RTS/CTS 
honoring and still interoperate on a day to day basis. The goal of this test is to determine 
whether or not a particular implementation systematically fails to honor a CTS packet 
reserving the media for another client. One of the biggest difficulties faced with this 
technique was obtaining a high-enough resolution clock from userland. 
Determining whether or not a client transmits inside a CTS window requires the 
ability to measure the time a packet was transmitted relative to others with micro-second 
resolution. Timers with this resolution aren't generally available in userland on many 
operating systems, and even if they are, accurately tying it to the reception of a packet 
would be difficult at best.   
Fortunately many Linux wireless device drivers prepend what has come to be 
known as “prism” headers. This header contains out of band information about a packet 
such as signal strength. It also contains two very useful timestamps, MAC-time and 
HOST-time. These timestamps measure when the packet was received by the card, and 
when it was handed off to the host operating system. They also have microsecond 
resolution. It should be noted that the same technique was used by other researchers 




A tool was developed to facilitate 802.11 identification using CTS packets.  
Conceptually, the tool is straightforward. The user specifies an interface to transmit on, 
another one to listen on, and number of packets to send. The tool will then send out CTS 
packets on the transmit interface and record all the traffic on the other.  In this 
implementation, the duration was set to a constant value of 32767. 
Once the tool has transmitted all the CTS packets, it analyzes the recorded traffic. 
The tool uses the microsecond timer's available in the prism headers to determine if any 
clients have transmitted inside a CTS window not allocated to them. If it finds any it 
writes a record out to a text file which is suitable for importing into a database.  
The tool keeps the analysis logic separate from the packet crafting and reception, 
and can be run on a packet capture (pcap) file as well. Below is an example of the output: 
 
Table 1.   Example output of CTS fingerprinter 
 
Pcap-file ./ch3.pcap
Total Pkts 2154 
Total violations  787 
Num CTS  814 
Num RTS   0 
Total Unparsable   0 
unparsable Ctrl   0 
unparsable Data   0 
anon CTRL violators 3497 
 
The “anon CTRL violators” refers to packets transmitted inside a CTS window 
that could not be pinned down to a specific address. Some control frames in the 802.11 
standard don’t include the address of the sender. In this example, many of the violators 
are actually the tool itself, transmitting a CTS packet inside the window of another. Here 




00:0F:B5:5D:92:6E, CTS_IGNORE,  CTS_WIN_VIOLATION, [ MGMT, 
0, 8, 32767, 28736] 
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This record indicates that a card with address 00:0F:B5:5D:92:6E transmitted a 
management frame (type 0) of subtype 8 (beacon). The final two columns indicate the 
size of the CTS window, and the number of milliseconds into the window when the 
transmission started. 
The ultimate goal of this technique was not to return a simple binary value 
indicating whether an individual implementation honors CTS windows. Rather it was to 
analyze violations for patterns. The idea was to explore whether implementations ignore 
CTS packets with durations that exceed some value where that value perhaps varies by 
chipset. Alternatively, certain implementations might transmit at different offsets into a 
CTS window.  However, none of these more advanced techniques was investigated 
because it quickly became clear that almost every implementation tested simply ignored 
CTS packets. It is not clear whether this is a bug in the code, a problem with the 
timestamps, or if the majority of implementations really ignore CTS packets.  
B. ASSOCIATION REDIRECTION 
When a client connects to an Access Point (AP), four frames are typically 
involved (six if shared key authentication is enabled). These consist of an authentication 
request, authentication response, association request, and association response.  
Association redirection is a technique that an AP can employ to actively 
fingerprint a client. When an AP modifies the second address in the association reply (the 
source address) the associating client will behave in uniquely identifiable ways. In a 
successful redirection, the client transmits data to the new BSSID 00:22:22:22:22:22, as 
illustrated under successful redirection in Figure 1.  In this figure, the original BSSID is 
00:11:22:33:44:55 and the redirected (new) BSSID is 00:22:22:22:22:22.  Surprisingly, 
only one 802.11 NIC was successfully redirected.  One might expect a failed redirection 
attempt to exhibit the behavior depicted in Figure 1 under unsuccessful redirection.  
There, the client quietly continues to transmit data to the BSSID used in the association 
request, ignoring the redirection attempt. However, most 802.11 implementations did not 
exhibit this behavior as we shall see. (See Appendix A). 
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Figure 1.   Association Redirection. 
 
Association redirection was motivated by an attempt to get 802.11 stations to be 
dynamically assigned to their own BSS from an AP. It was the puzzling responses 
generated from clients that launched the fingerprinting work of this thesis. The 
motivation for the redirection follows from the 802.11 standard which prescribes the way 
an end station is assigned to a Basic Service Set (BSS).  The state transition diagram on 
page 376 of the 1999 revision of the 802.11 standard specifies the assignment. [2]  Part of 







Figure 2.   Basic Service Set Assignment 
 
The diagram indicates that the associating station should set its BSSID to the second 
address in the received association response. The second address in all management 
frames is the source address.  The station belongs to the BSS identified by this BSSID.  
C. ASSOCIATION REDIRECTION AS A FINGERPRINTING TOOL 
As mentioned previously, when initially experimenting with association 
redirection, a wide variety of behaviors were observed.  In an effort to get more 
fingerprints the original idea behind association redirection was expanded from one 
experiment into a total of nine.  
The original transition diagram specifies that the AP should mangle the second  
address in the association response, which is the source address. The experiment was 
expanded to modify the 1) source address, 2) BSSID address, and finally 3) both 
addresses. Doing this gives the drivers more opportunity to differentiate themselves. 
When this technique was applied (modifying all possible combinations of addresses in 
Association replies), a total of six unique responses was observed. These responses are 
summarized in the table below. The details of each response are of only minor 






Table 2.   Unique responses to Association redirection in Association response frames. 
 
IGN_ASSOC_REPLY Client ignores association replies from AP. 
Never enters stage 3  
DUAL_ACK_DATA Client alternates transmission between both BSSIDS,  acks 
data frames. 
DUAL_NACK_DATA Client alternates transmission between both BSSIDS,  
doesn't ack data frames. 
REASSOC_NULL_ALSO Client sends no data except null data frames. Null data 
frames use new BSSID. Client attempts to re-associate with 
old BSSID. 
DEAUTH_FLOOD_NULL Client sends many (approx 10) de-auths, to: redirected 
BSSID, through: Null BSSID. No data packets sent. 
 
DEAUTH_TYPE_1 Client sends multiple deauths  to redirected BSSID through 
original BSSID 
 
Once the results for the first round of experiments were analyzed and found to be 
successful, another attempt to widen the spectrum of behaviors was made. This led to two 
more iterations, both similar to the first.  In one iteration, we modified the address fields 
in only the authentication replies. The unique results generated are shown in Table 3. 
Finally in the last experiment we modified addresses in both authentication and 
association replies. This generated no more unique responses. All of the individual 
implementations results are presented in Appendix A.  
 
Table 3.   Unique responses to Association redirection, limited to authentication replies. 
 
IGN_AUTH_REPLY Client ignores auth replies from AP. Never enters stage 2  
DUAL_BSSID Client alternates transmission between both BSSIDs. Acking of 
data unknown. 
DUAL_T1_DEAUTH DUAL_ACK_DATA but also transmits deauths to redirected 
BSSID through original BSSID 
 
Association Redirection as a fingerprinting technique proves quite capable of 
determining an implementations chipset. Although in this experiment each 
implementation was tested in nine unique situations, in reality an optimized set of tests 
could be computed. This would bring the number of associations required to get a 
fingerprint down significantly. Although recent work [6] has shown it to be relatively 
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easy to get clients to connect to an attacker-controlled AP, this requirement still makes 
Association Redirection less desirable than passive techniques, even in offensive 
scenarios where an attacker doesn't mind transmitting. Using Association Redirection in a 
defensive scenario would be possible, but requires strong cooperation between WIDS 
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IV. PASSIVE IDENTIFICATION 
Passive identification involves fingerprinting an implementation without 
transmitting any packets in the process. This immediately rules out trying to identify an 
implementation by observing what it does in special situations constructed to explore 
boundary behaviors.  This chapter describes a technique that identifies an 802.11 
implementation using various metrics for matching Duration fields in 802.11 frames.  
A. DURATION ANALYSIS 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the duration field is a 16 bit value which describes 
how long the station that currently has access to the medium intends to keep it, after the 
current transmission. Even though the duration field is 16 bits wide, it only takes on a few 
discrete values. Common values are 0 (for packets that are not acknowledged such as 
management frames broadcast during a Contention Period), and the time it takes for a 
SIFS (Short Interframe Spacing) interval plus an acknowledgment, used in transmitting 
unicast data frames. 
Variables that can affect the duration field include some parameters of the local 
Basic Service Set specified in a beacon’s fixed flags field. These include short slot time, 
short pre-amble, and of course, the data rates supported. The net result of this is that 
ideally a unique fingerprint for a given implementation would be taken across all possible 
variations of these parameters. For this work, four databases were created. The databases 
currently have human-friendly names (the name of the AP used to create them). In the 
future, the number of databases will grow large enough that an algorithmic naming 
scheme (rates-flags for example) will be employed. 
Since the performance of this technique varies with the parameters of the Basic 
Service Set with which it is associated, a brief introduction to the four networks it was 






Table 4.   Summary of databases created   
 
name rates flags 
Lexie 1.0 - 11.0 Mb/sec (b-only) 0x0021 (short pre-amble) 
mixed--wrt54g 1.0 - 54.0 (mixed) 0x0401, 0x0001 
(disables SST if a b client is in range)
mixed--AirPlus 1.0 - 54.0 (mixed) 0x0421 (SST, short pre-amble) 
G--wrt54g 1.0 - 54.0 (G-only) 0x0421 (SST, short-preamble) 
 
Table 4 represents data about the four WLANs on which all experiments in this 
section were performed. They were chosen to give a good estimate of real world network 
deployments.  Lexie is a b-only Cisco aironet 350.  Mixed--wrt54g is a rev5 Linksys 
wrt54g running in mixed mode. Mixed--Airplus is a D-link DI-524, and G--wrt54g is a 
rev5 Linksys wrt54g in g-only mode.  The models of the Access Points used are 
mentioned to give the reader some sense of market representation. The databases 
generated from each AP are not tied to that specific AP. Clients should respond 
identically in any BSS with the same set of parameters listed above. 
B. WHAT IS IN A PRINT DATABASE? 
The tools and techniques described in this chapter all operate on a surprisingly 
little amount of information, stored in what we call a print database. There is a 
fingerprint for each implementation.  A fingerprint comprises a list of records of the form 
(packet_type, duration-value, count) which reflects for the given packet type, the number 
of times the given duration value appeared. All data and management frames are 
observed while control packets are discarded.  
Two example prints from the same database are given in Tables 5 and 6. Both 
prints were generated from packet captures done while a client associates, obtains an IP 
address from DHCP, and proceeds to load a few web pages. With so little activity, there 
is a remarkable range of behaviors.  These two prints were chosen to illustrate the range 
of behaviors between Atheros and Prism chipsets.  
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Table 5.   Implementation-Id: 1 (Atheros, ar5211.sys), database: Lexie 
 
packet-type  (duration  
[duration observed frequency /number packets of  this type]) 
Assoc Request    (314 [2/2])  
  probe request    (0 [75/77])  (314 [2/77])  
  Authentication    (314 [2/2])  
        Data    (162 [167/278])  (0 [111/278])  
  Null Function    (162 [597/597]) 
 
Table 6.   Implementation-Id: 9 (Prism-2.5, smc2532w.sys), database: Lexie 
 
Assoc Request    (258 [13/13])  
  probe request    (0 [50/50])  
  Authentication    (53389 [13/13])  
        Data  (213 [1229/1303])  (0[54/1303])  (223[20/1303])  
  Null Function    (37554 [16/16]) 
 
Two things stand out immediately from these fingerprints. The first is that the second 
implementation (the prism2.5 based implementation) uses duration values that are 
entirely different than those used by the better behaved Atheros card. Secondly, the 
prism2.5 based implementation uses two illegal duration values. The standard says that 
any values greater than 32767 should be ignored.  
Though these two implementations are different enough that they can be easily 
distinguished, most of the other implementations sampled fell somewhere between them. 
To get better resolution, two ratios were introduced: the ratio of packets with a given 
duration relative to the total number of packets sampled, and the ratio of pairs (packet 
type, duration) for a given packet type and duration relative to the total number of packets 
seen of that packet type. 
Though these numbers can fluctuate across different samples for the same 
implementation, they proved to be stable enough to cause an improvement in the 
algorithms that use them. Tables 7 and 8 show this information for the Atheros 




Table 7.   Implementation-Id: 1 (Atheros, ar5211.sys), database: Lexie 
 
packet type  (duration [ratio of packets with this duration, for given packet-type])
Assoc Request   (314 [100%])  
  probe request   (  0 [ 97%]) (314 [  3%])  
  Authentication   (314 [100%])  
        Data   (162 [ 60%]) (  0 [ 40%])  
  Null Function   (162 [100%]) 
 
Table 8.   Implementation-Id: 1 (Atheros, ar5211.sys), database: Lexie 
 





C. THE DURATION MATCHING ALGORITHM 
The matching algorithm expects as input a packet capture (pcap) file gotten by 
sniffing the exchange between an 802.11 NIC and one of the 802.11 Access Points for 
which a print database has been assembled for a collection of 802.11 implementations.  
The input is compared against each print in the database using a particular matching 
metric.  We give five matching metrics.  Each matching metric produces a scalar quantity 
measuring the degree of match between the input and a print.  The algorithm outputs a 
list of 802.11 implementations ordered by decreasing degree of match.   
The metrics are presented in order of increasing complexity.  Values from one 
metric are not intended to be comparable to values from another.  
D. SIMPLECOMPARISON METRIC 
SimpleCompare is the first of three related metrics, the other two being 
MediumCompare and ComplexCompare. SimpleCompare is unique in that it compares 
the input against a print in the database without using any information about other prints 
in the database. That means that if a certain duration value is incredibly unique, such as 
the illegal ones only found in prism2 based implementations, it has no opportunity to take 
this into consideration. 
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All the metrics presented in this section break the fingerprints up into two 
different sets of data points. The first set is a set of pairs of the form (duration value, 
count). The second set is a set of triples of the form (packet type, duration value, count). 
The diagrams below leave the count component of both tuples out for clarity. 
SimpleCompare, as well as the other metrics, has three different flavors. It can be 
computed using just the (duration value, count) pairs, or it can be computed using just the 
(packet type, duration value, count) triples.  Finally the results from both analyses can be 
combined. Combining the results of these metrics is simply a matter of adding the return 
values from both metrics. 
SimpleCompare utilizes two functions that are used throughout this section. They 
are used to compute the duration ratios in tables 7 and 8, and are defined as follows. 
duration_ratio(p,d) = # of packets with packet_type = p, duration=d
# of total packets with packet_type = p
 
duration_ratio(d) = # of packets with duration=d
# of total packets observed
 
The SimpleCompare metric is defined below.  The input packet capture is denoted by L.  










Figure 3.    SimpleCompare duration-value only analysis  
 
The metric weights common durations that appear in their respective prints at 
roughly the same rate more heavily than ones that do not. However, SimpleCompare does 
not pay attention to duration values that aren't in the intersection, as illustrated in Figure 
1, even though the number of values not in the intersection is clearly a strong indicator of 
how close two prints match.  It also doesn't have any idea of how unique any specific 
duration values are across the entire database. 
sum = 0; 
for every duration-value d ∈(L I R)  
sum += 1.0 - | L.duration_ratio(d) - R.duration_ratio(d) | 
return sum; 
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At first, this lack of a global perspective on the relative likeliness of seeing 
duration values seemed that it would hinder this algorithm significantly. Consider the 
case when a prism2 sample is input that uses all the same illegal duration values as the 
one stored in the database, but at very different rates. SimpleCompare lacks the 
information to realize that the illegal values identify a prism2 implementation, and could 
grade this sample incorrectly. 
At this point, SimpleCompare is also ignoring the packet type in which the 
duration values appear. This can cause two problems. One is that two different 
implementations use the same duration value, but in consistently different packet types 
(probe requests versus association responses for example). The other is that the ratio that 
duration values are used across all packet types fluctuate largely across packet samples, 
but the rate is much more consistent when confined to a particular packet type. Both of 
these problems are addressed by considering the packet types when looking at durations. 
We can reuse SimpleCompare except this time we run it against the (packet type, 
duration) pairs, as illustrated below. 
 
Figure 4.   SimpleCompare (packet type, duration) analysis 
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E. MEDIUMCOMPARE METRIC 
SimpleCompare does not account for highly-unique duration values. 
MediumCompare was created as an alternative to deal more intelligently with such 
duration values.  Intuitively, if two prints both use duration values that are globally 
unique (i.e. illegal values generated by prism2-based implementations) then this should 
count more than matching very common values such as 0. 
Like SimpleCompare, the MediumCompare metric compares an input pcap with 
every print in the database except that for each print in the database, it also considers 
global duration uniqueness by examining the rest of the database.  It computes one of two 
weights, either duration uniqueness, or packet type duration uniqueness, depending on 
the data set as follows. 
When computing duration uniqueness the metric counts the total number of 
unique (implementation, duration value) pairs in the entire database. This does not take 
into account how often an individual duration value appears in packets for a given 
implementation. Rather, it counts how often a duration value is used across all 
implementations.  If two implementations both use duration value 314, but one uses it 1% 
of the time, and the other uses it 80% of the time, both of these implementations will 
contribute the same amount to duration uniqueness.  
duration_uniqueness(d) = # of unique (implementation, duration) tuples
# of unique(implementation, duration = d) tuples
 
Similarly packet type duration uniqueness is computed by counting the total 
number of unique (implementation, packet type duration) values across the entire 
database.  
sum = 0; 
for every pair (packet_type p, duration-value d) ∈(L I R)  
   sum += 1.0 - | L.duration_ratio(p,d) - R.duration_ratio(p,d)| 
return sum; 
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duration_uniqueness(p,d) = # of unique (implementation, packet_type, duration) tuples
# of unique(implementation, packet_type =  p duration = d) tuples
 




Figure 5.   MediumCompare duration-value only analysis 
 
 
sum = 0; 
for every  duration-value d ∈(L I R)  
   sum += duration_uniqueness(d) *  





Figure 6.   MediumCompare (packet_type, duration) analysis 
 
F. COMPLEXCOMPARE METRIC 
Notice that the MediumCompare and SimpleCompare metrics ignore durations 
outside the intersection.  One might think that such information would improve a 
fingerprinting capability, however, we found this is not the case.  To illustrate, a metric 
called ComplexCompare was investigated.  It was designed to take into account all the 
data points that don't fall in the intersection of two prints. ComplexCompare computes 
the metric that MediumCompare does and then visits every data point not in the 
intersection of the prints, computing duration uniqueness, or packet type duration 
uniqueness and then subtracting this value from the metric. The motivation for this 
behavior is that if L contains very unique durations and R doesn’t, then the metric should 
be decreased proportionally by the uniqueness of these values. 
sum = 0; 
for every packet_type p, duration-value d ∈(L I R)  
   sum+= packet_type_duration_uniqueness(p,d) * 













for every duration-value d ∉(L I R)  
   sum+=duration_uniqueness(d) 






Figure 8.   ComplexCompare (packet_type, duration) analysis 
 
G. BAYESCOMPARE METRIC 
BayesCompare was created as an attempt to use a well understood rule to classify 
802.11 implementations. In document classification, the problem is that of given a set W 
of words appearing in a document, classify the document as belonging to one of several 
categories.  One takes the category to be the category C that maximizes P(W | C) P(C).  
The conditional probability P(W | C) comes from a training set of documents known to be 
in category C.  If we take W to be the set of durations occurring in a given packet capture 
that we want to identify by implementation then P(W | C) becomes the probability of W 
occurring in a capture given that the capture comes from 802.11 implementation C. 
Classification in this manner is only as good as the training set (print database).  A 
given training set may not yet know that implementation C can produce duration D.  
ret= MediumCompare(L,R); 
for every packet_type p, duration-value d ∉(L I R)  
   sum+=packet_type_duration_uniqueness(p,d) 
return ret - sum; 
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Hence P(W | C), which is approximated from the training set, is zero when W contains D 
even though W may contain another duration that uniquely identifies C.  Further, 
approximating P(C) is problematic, as it is the probability of seeing a given 802.11 
implementation.  One might approximate it by perhaps chipset market share but this 
would be somewhat inaccurate because it ignores the fact that a device driver is part of an 
802.11 implementation we wish to identify.  Getting an accurate approximation of it is 
difficult so we chose to ignore it.  This of course puts the metric at a slight disadvantage 
compared to the other metrics, as we shall see.  
Let X be an 802.11 implementation for which a fingerprint exists in the print 
database. Let L be the duration fingerprint arising from an input pcap file. We want the 
probability that the input pcap file originated with implementation X given L:  P(X | L).  
Using Bayes rule, P(X | L) = (P(L | X) P(X)) / P(L).  The idea here is to use these 
conditional probabilities to rank the degree of a match between L and each fingerprint in 
the print database.  Therefore, we did not compute P(L) for a given input pcap as it is 
constant across all fingerprints in the database.  Of course probability P(X) is not constant 
across all fingerprints but computing it is problematic, as discussed above.  Therefore, we 
didn’t compute it as part of the conditional probability.  Further, to simplify things, we 
approximated P(L | X) as the product P(d1 | X) · P(d2 | X) ·  … · P(dn | X) where d1, d2,… 
are the distinct durations that appear in L.  This assumes that the individual duration 
values in L occur independently which one can argue isn’t true since the durations occur 
in sequence for certain control frames, for instance, duration values in ACK, RTS and 
CTS frames. But as mentioned previously, control frames are ignored in fingerprints.   
If L denotes the fingerprint arising from an input pcap file and R a fingerprint in 
the print database then we take the preceding product to be ∏ R.duration_ratio(d) where 
d ranges over all durations in L.  And when taking into account packet types in which 
durations occur, it becomes ∏ R.duration_ratio(p, d) where p and d range over all packet 
















ret = 1.0 
for every  duration-value d ∈L  





Figure 10.   BayesCompare (packet_type, duration) analysis 
 
H. MODIFIED BAYESCOMPARE METRIC 
Another variant of BayesCompare was investigated.  As pointed out above, 
conditional probability P(L | X) can become zero if L has a duration that has not yet been 
learned to be producible by implementation X, perhaps because the print database hasn’t 
been updated for some time.  So another version was explored where only duration 
values that fall in the intersection of an input fingerprint L and a database fingerprint R 
are included in the calculation of P(L | X).  So the product becomes ∏ R.duration_ratio(d)  
 
ret = 1.0 
for every  packet_type p, duration-value d ∈L  




where d ranges over all durations in L ∩ R, and ∏ R.duration_ratio(p, d) where p and d 
range over all packet types and durations respectively where duration d occurs in a packet 




Figure 11.   BayesCompare-Modified duration value only analysis 
 
 
ret = 1.0 
for every  duration-value d ∈(L∩R)  






Figure 12.   BayesCompare-Modified (packet-type, duration) analysis 
ret = 1.0 
for every  packet_type p, duration-value d ∈(L∩R)  
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V. RESULTS FOR DURATION-BASED METRICS 
This chapter presents performance results for each of the duration-based matching 
metrics described in Chapter V.  To compare the performance of these metrics, a rating 
system was devised as follows.  Each metric was exercised across four print databases 
using three packet capture samples s1, s2 and s3 as input for each 802.11 implementation.  
We define for each 802.11 implementation I, a success probability RI for a matching 
metric M.  It is the probability that M correctly identifies a sample, that is, identifies that 
sample as originating with I when it does indeed originate with I.   
For example, consider the table in Table 9.  This print database has 13 fingerprints 
hence there are 13 entries.  The table was produced by using the MediumCompare metric 
on a particular sample.  The tables tells us that this metric believes the sample originated 
with the Broadcom-MiniPCI (ID 10 in the table) since it has rank zero.  But this is 
incorrect.  The sample originated with the Apple-Airport Extreme (ID 5), which has rank 
“1”.  So we take as SimpleCompare’s probability of succeeding when the sample 
originates with Apple-Airport Extreme to be (13 – rank)/13 or (13 – 1)/13 since the 
correct implementation is given rank “1” by the metric.  
Now since there are three samples, we extend RI for a metric M to be  
RI = [(13 – s1 rank) + (13 – s2 rank) + (13 – s3 rank)] / (3 * 13) (eq. 5.1) 
where si rank is the rank assigned by M to the 802.11 implementation I that actually 
produced sample si.  If the probability that I occurs is PI then the success rate of M is the 
unconditional probability of success given by 
PI1 * RI1 +  PI2 * RI2 + … + PI13 * RI13 
Each term in this sum is the product of the probability of seeing a sample from one of the 
13 implementations and the probability of M succeeding to identify it in that case.  So M 
could have a good overall success rate even though it performs badly when trying to 
identify a sample as belonging to some 802.11 implementation if that implementation 
doesn’t arise often.  However, we shall assume that implementations are equally likely to 
occur.  In that case, the sum above becomes (RI1 +  RI2 + … + RI13) / 13. 
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Table 9.   Ordered list generated from a matching metric. 
 
rank score ID Model chipset driver 
0 79.03 10 Broadcom-MiniPCI BCM4318 bcmwl5.sys 





2 73.51 6 Zonet-ZEW1520 BCM4306 bcmwl5.sys 
3 56.03 7 Intel-IPW220BG IPW2200BG w29n51.sys 
4 54.74 13 Cisco-Aironet-350 Prism2 pcx500.sys 
5 53.06 11 Sony-PSP unknown unknown 
6 47.19 8 D-Link-dwl-g122 RA2570 rt2500usb.sys 















10 38.53 1 Linksys-WPC55AG AR5212 ar5211.sys 
11 28.55 12 Nintendo-DS unknown unknown 
12 22.61 9 SMC-2532W-B Prism2.5 smc2532w.sys 
 
A. SIMPLECOMPARE 
The following tables show how well SimpleCompare did against all four 
databases. The number of samples represents how many pcap files the input fingerprints 
were computed across. 1-sample means that the fingerprint was computed only from the 
first sample for a given implementation, while 3-sample means all three pcap files were 
used to generate the print. 
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Table 10 below shows how well SimpleCompare does when it is only analyzing 
durations not (packet_type, duration) pairs. Table 11 shows how well SimpleCompare 
does when it only analyzed (packet_type, duration) pairs. Table 12 shows the results 
when both techniques are combined. 
 
Table 10.   SimpleCompare, duration values only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9724 0.9546 0.9745 0.9115 
2-samples 0.9783 0.9408 0.9630 0.8854 
1-samples 0.9586 0.9408 0.9583 0.8333 
Average 0.9698 0.9454 0.9653 0.8767 
     
Total Average 0.9393   
 
Table 11.   SimpleCompare, (packet_type, duration) pairs only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9921 0.9606 0.9769 0.9688 
2-samples 0.9901 0.9645 0.9861 0.9479 
1-samples 0.9744 0.9586 0.9745 0.9531 
Average 0.9855 0.9612 0.9792 0.9566 
     
Total Average 0.9706   
 
Table 12.   SimpleCompare combined. 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9901 0.9882 0.9884 0.9531 
2-samples 0.9882 0.9684 0.9861 0.9531 
1-samples 0.9744 0.9625 0.9769 0.9115 
Average 0.9842 0.9730 0.9838 0.9392 
     
Total Average 0.9701   
 
Though combining the two techniques did not improve the overall average, it did 
have one important effect. In the combined table, scores consistently increase with 
sample size, across all databases. This is not the case in either of the two tables preceding 







Although MediumCompare has significantly more information at its disposal than 
SimpleCompare (since MediumCompare gets the entire print database over which to 
compute weights) it only improved its best-case score by .0017 relative to 
SimpleCompare. This seems to indicate that while knowing certain duration values are 
highly unique, the implementations that used them identified them enough already that 
the extra weight given to them wasn't needed in general. 
 
Table 13.   MediumCompare, (packet_type, duration) pairs only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9921 0.9684 0.9907 0.9635 
2-samples 0.9901 0.9625 0.9884 0.9375 
1-samples 0.9882 0.9546 0.9861 0.9427 
Average 0.9901 0.9618 0.9884 0.9479 
     
Total Average 0.9721   
 
C. COMPLEXCOMPARE 
ComplexCompare did not improve upon its predecssors, performing consistently 
worse then Simple or MediumCompare.  In fact, no algorithm tested that attempted to 
take into consideration duration values that don't match ever made an improvement upon 
those that simply ignored them.  
 
Table 14.   ComplexCompare, (packet_type, duration) pairs only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9744 0.9566 0.9722 0.8958 
2-samples 0.9763 0.9507 0.9722 0.9062 
1-samples 0.9803 0.9507 0.9931 0.9323 
Average 0.9770 0.9527 0.9792 0.9114 
     
Total Average 0.9551   
 
D. BAYESCOMPARE 
Considering the significant disadvantage that BayesCompare is at relative to the 
other metrics, it performed quite well. It is quite possible that in practice BayesCompare 
could be the most accurate. This could be accomplished by mapping the probability of 
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seeing particular chipset, device-driver implementation back to the marketshare of the 
chipset. This optimization is not implemented in the current system, and both flavors of 
BayesCompare do worse than the other metrics presented. 
E. MODIFIED BAYESCOMPARE 
The ModifiedBayesCompare did consistently worse than BayesCompare. This 
seems to indicate that contrary to our original suspicion, having the conditional 
probabilities go to zero when an unknown duration value is encountered is a good idea.  
F. RESULTS SUMMARY 
A table representing a summary of the algorithms performance is below. It is 
interesting to note that while MediumCompare out-performed SimpleCompare, it only 
did so by a small margin. This seems to indicate that SimpleCompare has little trouble 
identifying the implementations that use globally unique duration values, even though 
SimpleCompare is unaware of the uniqueness.  
 
Table 15.   Results summary 
 
Matching Metric dur packet-type, dur combined 
SimpleCompare 0.9393 0.9706 0.9701 
MediumCompare 0.9381 0.9721 0.9621 
ComplexCompare 0.9370 0.9551 0.9500 
BayesCompare 0.8456 0.9190 0.9209 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Two categories of identification were investigated: active and passive. In the 
active category, association redirection proved more promising as a way to identify 
802.11 implementations than CTS window honoring.  On the passive side, we described 
five metrics for matching a given packet capture with a training set of packets called a 
print database.  The matching is done on duration fields in frames.  The simplest of the 
metrics rivals the more complex ones in accuracy.   
An entirely different type of metric, dubbed FuzzyCompare, was also developed. 
Fuzzy Compare works by comparing every (packet_type, duration) tuple in a print (L) to 
every other tuple in the other print, R. For each comparison it modifies the score based on 
a set of coefficients and the global uniqueness of the current duration value. 
The interesting aspect about this algorithm is that the coefficients were actually 
brute-forced by another program to (a modification to duration-print-grader) to find the 
best possible combination of coefficients. This lead it to produce impressive results, but it 
couldn't be shown that the coefficients generated would generalize well to data sets with 
unknown inputs.  
FuzzyCompare extended the notion of a fingerprint to include whether or not 
certain implementations make use of the various flag bits inside the 802.11 header. This 
really simplified down to tracking which implementations utilize power savings, as the 
rest of the flags were always unused. Tracking a few more bits seemed to give 
FuzzyCompare a significant advantage over the other algorithms which strictly analyzed 
the duration field. Such a hybrid technique will probably yield better real world results. 
A. FUTURE WORK - MAC VS PHY FINGERPRINTING  
The 802.11 standard is responsible not only for specifying the media access 
controls of wireless networks, but also the physical (PHY) layer as well. This thesis 
focuses on analyzing the MAC portion of the standard, but one could imagine a tool that 
analyzes aspects of the PHY for unique signatures. 
Such a device would need the ability to analyze the frequency that 802.11 
operates in (2.4GHz, 5GHz or the rarely-implemented IR band). Since the goal of the 
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device is to be able to analyze what typical consumer level cards are doing, it would 
likely need components capable of measuring physical characteristics of the medium with 
higher levels of precision than that available on commercially-available 802.11 cards. 
Likely candidates for such a device include measuring the type of preamble used in 
802.11 frames and the thresholds used by cards to detect that the medium is busy. 
This thesis has demonstrated that it is possible to remotely determine which 
802.11 implementation generated traffic by analyzing a small sample taken during the 
association phase. Chipset level resolution was achieved by both duration analysis and 
association redirection. Device driver (and even device driver version) resolution was 
achieved in many cases when using duration analysis. 
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APPENDIX A.  COMPLETE RESULTS 
A. ASSOCIATION REDIRECTION RESULTS 
The following 3 tables encode all of the results generated from the association 
redirection experiments laid out in Chapter III. Each table represents an experiment. For 
example, the first entry in the first table denotes that the 802.11 implementation with ID-
number 1 ignored an association reply packet that had its source address mangled.  The 
same entry in the second table indicates the driver came close to redirecting when the 
source address in the authentication reply was mangled (not the association reply). 
A quick glance at the tables below reveals there is a strong tendency for cards 
with the same chipset to display similar characteristics. For example, every card with a 
Broadcom chipset (5, 6, and 10) behave identically across all three tables even though 
one is using Apple's airport extreme driver, and the two others are on Windows. 
There is one example where this technique reaches down to distinguish different 
devices using the same chipset but a different driver. Implementation #1 has an identical 
chipset as implementation #2. However #2 displays different behavior because it is using 
a slightly different driver (provided by Atheros, not Linksys). 
 
Table 16.    Association Redirection results, Association replies only 
 
Id-
num driver-id  SRC BSS SRC,BSS 
1  ar5211.sys  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY 
2  ntpr11ag.sys  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY  DUAL_ACK_DATA  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY 
3  (ntpr11ag.sys)  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY DUAL_ACK_DATA  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY 
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Id-
num driver-id  SRC BSS SRC,BSS 
4  (ntpr11ag.sys)  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY  DUAL_ACK_DATA  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY 
5  AppleAirport2bcm4318 DEAUTH_FLOOD_ NULL  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY  
DEAUTH_FLOOD_ 
NULL  
6  BCMWL5.sys  DEAUTH_FLOOD_ NULL  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY  
DEAUTH_FLOOD 
_NULL  
7  w29n51.sys  DUAL_NACK_DATA DUAL_NACK_DATA DUAL_NACK_DATA  
8  rt2500usb.sys  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY  DUAL_ACK_DATA  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY 
9  smc2532w.sys  DEAUTH_TYPE_1  REASSOC_NULL_ ALSO  
REASSOC_NULL_ 
ALSO  







Table 17.   Association Redirection results, Authentication replies only 
 
id-
num driver-id  SRC BSS SRC,BSS 
1  ar5211.sys  DUAL_BSSID  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
2  ntpr11ag.sys  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
3  (ntpr11ag.sys)  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
4  (ntpr11ag.sys)  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
5  AppleAirport2-bcm4318  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  DUAL_T1_DEAUTH  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
6  BCMWL5.sys  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  DUAL_T1_DEAUTH  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
7  w29n51.sys  DUAL_NACK_DATA  DUAL_NACK_DATA  DUAL_NACK_DATA  
8  rt2500usb.sys  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  DUAL_ACK_DATA  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
9  smc2532w.sys  DEAUTH_TYPE_1  DUAL_T1_DEAUTH  DUAL_T1_DEAUTH  
10  bcmwl5.sys  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  DUAL_T1_DEAUTH  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
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Table 18.   Association Redirection results, Authentication and Association replies 
 
id-
num driver-id  SRC BSS SRC,BSS 
1  ar5211.sys  IGN_ASSOC_REPLY IGN_AUTH_REPLY  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
2  ntpr11ag.sys  IGN_AUTH_REPLY IGN_AUTH_REPLY  IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
3  (ntpr11ag.sys)  IGN_AUTH_REPLY IGN_AUTH_REPLY IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
4  (ntpr11ag.sys)  IGN_AUTH_REPLY IGN_AUTH_REPLY IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
5  AppleAirport2-bcm4318  IGN_AUTH_REPLY IGN_ASSOC_REPLY IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
6  BCMWL5.sys  IGN_AUTH_REPLY IGN_ASSOC_REPLY IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
7  w29n51.sys  DUAL_NACK_DATA DUAL_NACK_DATA DUAL_NACK_DATA  
8  rt2500usb.sys  IGN_AUTH_REPLY DUAL_ACK_DATA IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
9  smc2532w.sys  DEAUTH_TYPE_1 REASSOC_NULL_ALSO REASSOC_NULL_ALSO 
10  bcmwl5.sys  IGN_AUTH_REPLY IGN_ASSOC_REPLY IGN_AUTH_REPLY  
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Table 19.   Association redirection results key. 
 
Behavior Description 
IGN_AUTH_REPLY Client ignores auth replies from AP. Never enters 
stage 2  
IGN_ASSOC_REPLY Client ignores assoc replies from AP. Never 
enters stage 3  
REASSOC_NULL_ALSO Client sends no data except null data frames. Null 
data frames use new BSSID. Client attempts to 
reassociate with old BSSID. 
DUAL_BSSID Client  alternates transmission between both 
BSSIDs. Acking of data unknown. 
DUAL_ACK_DAT A DUAL_BSSID, but acks data frames 
DUAL_NACK_DATA DUAL_BSSID, but doesn't- ack data frames 
DEAUTH_TYPE_1 Client sends multiple deauths  to redirected 
BSSID through original BSSID 
DEAUTH_FLOOD_NULL Client sends many (approx 10) de-auths, to: 
redirected BSSID, through: Null BSSID. No data 
packets sent. 
DUAL_T1_DEAUTH  DUAL_ACK_DATA, but also transmits type1 deauths. 
 
B. DURATION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
These tables show the results from every experiment conducted using the 
matching metrics outlined in Chapter IV. The values in the tables are the success rate of a 
matching metric across an entire database.  
1. SimpleCompare Results 
Table 20.   SimpleCompare, duration values only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9724 0.9546 0.9745 0.9115 
2-samples 0.9783 0.9408 0.9630 0.8854 
1-samples 0.9586 0.9408 0.9583 0.8333 
Average 0.9698 0.9454 0.9653 0.8767 
     




Table 21.   SimpleCompare, (packet_type, duration) pairs only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9921 0.9606 0.9769 0.9688 
2-samples 0.9901 0.9645 0.9861 0.9479 
1-samples 0.9744 0.9586 0.9745 0.9531 
Average 0.9855 0.9612 0.9792 0.9566 
     
Total Average 0.9706   
 
Table 22.   SimpleCompare combined. 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9901 0.9882 0.9884 0.9531 
2-samples 0.9882 0.9684 0.9861 0.9531 
1-samples 0.9744 0.9625 0.9769 0.9115 
Average 0.9842 0.9730 0.9838 0.9392 
     
Total Average 0.9701   
 
2. MediumCompare Results 
 
Table 23.   MediumCompare, duration values only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9724 0.9606 0.9745 0.9062 
2-samples 0.9783 0.9369 0.9630 0.8802 
1-samples 0.9606 0.9408 0.9560 0.8281 
Average 0.9704 0.9461 0.9645 0.8715 
     
Total Average 0.9381   
 
Table 24.   MediumCompare, (packet_type, duration) pairs only 
 
 MediumCompare: (packet-type, dur)  
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9921 0.9684 0.9907 0.9635 
2-samples 0.9901 0.9625 0.9884 0.9375 
1-samples 0.9882 0.9546 0.9861 0.9427 
Average 0.9901 0.9618 0.9884 0.9479 
     







Table 25.   MediumCompare combined. 
 
 MediumCompare: combined  
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9862 0.9842 0.9884 0.9375 
2-samples 0.9862 0.9645 0.9792 0.9323 
1-samples 0.9842 0.9527 0.9745 0.8750 
Average 0.9855 0.9671 0.9807 0.9149 
     
Total Average 0.9621   
 
3. ComplexCompare Results 
 
Table 26.   ComplexCompare, duration values only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9684 0.9448 0.9606 0.8906 
2-samples 0.9704 0.9290 0.9560 0.8802 
1-samples 0.9665 0.9349 0.9722 0.8698 
Average 0.9684 0.9362 0.9629 0.8802 
     
Total Average 0.9370   
 
Table 27.   ComplexCompare, (packet_type, duration) pairs only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9744 0.9566 0.9722 0.8958 
2-samples 0.9763 0.9507 0.9722 0.9062 
1-samples 0.9803 0.9507 0.9931 0.9323 
Average 0.9770 0.9527 0.9792 0.9114 
     
Total Average 0.9551   
 
Table 28.   ComplexCompare combined. 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9744 0.9606 0.9745 0.8854 
2-samples 0.9744 0.9448 0.9745 0.8906 
1-samples 0.9763 0.9448 0.9884 0.9115 
Average 0.9750 0.9501 0.9791 0.8958 
     




4. BayesCompare Results 
 
Table 29.   BayesCompare, duration values only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9211 0.8698 0.9028 0.7396 
2-samples 0.9191 0.8659 0.9051 0.7292 
1-samples 0.9034 0.8639 0.8241 0.7031 
Average 0.9145 0.8665 0.8773 0.7240 
     
Total Average 0.8456   
 
Table 30.   BayesCompare, (packet_type, duration) pairs only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9566 0.9329 0.9745 0.9375 
2-samples 0.9566 0.9132 0.9745 0.8698 
1-samples 0.9310 0.8935 0.8750 0.8125 
Average 0.9481 0.9132 0.9413 0.8733 
     
Total Average 0.9190   
 
Table 31.   BayesCompare combined. 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9329 0.9290 0.9745 0.9375 
2-samples 0.9310 0.9211 0.9745 0.9219 
1-samples 0.9152 0.9172 0.8727 0.8229 
Average 0.9264 0.9224 0.9406 0.8941 
     
Total Average 0.9209   
 
5. BayesCompare-Modified Results 
Table 32.   BayesCompare-modified, duration values only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixec--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.3136 0.2643 0.2569 0.3229 
2-samples 0.2959 0.2446 0.2593 0.3125 
1-samples 0.2919 0.2485 0.2639 0.3646 
Average 0.3005 0.2525 0.2600 0.3333 
     




Table 33.   BayesCompare-modified, (packet_type, duration) pairs only 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.9546 0.9191 0.9699 0.9219 
2-samples 0.9487 0.9093 0.9699 0.8906 
1-samples 0.9290 0.8817 0.9421 0.8542 
Average 0.9441 0.9034 0.9606 0.8889 
     
Total Average 0.9243   
 
Table 34.   BayesCompare-modified combined. 
 
 lexie mixed--wrt54g mixed--AirPlus G--wrt54g 
3-samples 0.7692 0.7416 0.8009 0.8281 
2-samples 0.7318 0.7318 0.7870 0.7917 
1-samples 0.6746 0.6982 0.7083 0.7396 
Average 0.7252 0.7239 0.7654 0.7865 
     
Total Average 0.7502   
 
6. Duration analysis Results Summary 
Table 35.   Results summary 
 
 dur packet-type, dur combined 
SimpleCompare 0.9393 0.9706 0.9701 
MediumCompare 0.9381 0.9721 0.9621 
ComplexCompare 0.9370 0.9551 0.9500 
BayesCompare 0.8456 0.9190 0.9209 
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APPENDIX B.  IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
All of the techniques except association redirection were implemented on a Linux 
machine in userland. Early on in the project it was clear that an easy to use 802.11 packet 
crafting and parsing library would have to be created. A survey of currently available 
solutions including libnet, libdnet, and scapy was made, but all were found to be lacking. 
The biggest reason is that most of these tools are centered around crafting packets, not 
parsing them. Something that could be used to quickly develop new tests was created. 
The result was libairware, a C++ library specifically designed to easily craft and parse 
802.11 packets.  
The ability to craft and parse packets would not be very useful without a reliable 
way to inject them. Fortunately many Linux wireless drivers can be coaxed to bypass the 
802.11 state machine and inject packets into the air. In fact, there are so many different 
device driver patches floating around that it can be hard to keep track of them.  
Joshua Wright and Mike Kershaw were interested in the ability to easily inject 
packets from userland on Linux as well. They were also interested in being able to write 
device-driver agnostic code to do it. The result of their work is a cross driver generic 
802.11 packet injection library called LORCON (Loss of Radio Connectivity).  
All of the code that was written for this project makes extensive use of LORCON 
to inject packets. Though code that can use LORCON to inject packets can be re-targeted 
at runtime to use a different driver, the experiments done in this paper used a D-Link 
DWL-g-122 card with the 2006021620 CVS release of the rt2570 driver to inject packets.   
The specified version of rt2570 does actually allow for the reception of packets in 
monitor mode when it is not injecting, however it was decided that doing so may interfere 
with the delicate timestamps required. Therefore a second card was used whenever 
injection and reception were required simultaneously. This second card was a Linksys 
WPC55ag using CVS version 20051025 of madwifi-old. This card contains an AR5212 




though they should make no difference. Practically speaking, the choice of which 
driver/chipset to use for monitoring packets should be unimportant as long as it supports 
prism headers with microsecond resolution timers. 
A. PCAP CREATION FOR DURATION ANALYSIS 
Pcaps created for this project were intentionally not generated by any sort of 
highly automated process. Captures were created of all cards being powered on and 
searching for a network before joining. After joining they loaded between 4 and 20 
webpages. In one database (G--wrt54g) the capture was run explicitly until 5000 packets 
had been received (representing the high end of data sampled). The results generated 
were not significantly better than those databases where the packet captures were stopped 
in an ad-hoc manner using less data.  
The implications of these considerations are that the prints currently created are 
not strictly representative of clients that are already associated to a network. These prints 
best represent the behavior of clients around a small window of time centered on them 
associating to a network. Though this period of time is not very packet-intensive, a lot of 
important information is gleaned from the duration values contained in the management 
frames that are exchanged. When implementing this technique in the wild the best thing 
to do is probably only examine packets exchanged within a window around client 
association. Merely sampling packets once association has happened will not yield as 
diverse results. 
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APPENDIX C.  TOOL USAGE 
A. DURATION ANALYSIS 
While implementing the algorithms outlined in the Chapter IV, three important 
tools were created, duration-print-generator, duration-print-matcher, and duration-print-
grader. The results of this technique are explained in terms of these tools. 
duration-print-generator simply takes in an input pcap and a MAC address, 
computes all the values outlined in the previous chapters, and writes them out to disk (a 
.prnt file) 
duration-print-matcher takes an  input pcap, MAC address to fingerprint, and a set 
of previously computed prints (the print database). It then computes the print for the input 
pcap and finds the closest match. The following table shows the output of an example 
duration-print-matcher run. In this case duration-print-matcher is attempting to determine 
what implementation best maps to the card with the MAC address 00:0a:95:f3:2f:ab in 
the  5-1-lexie.pcap, against all of the saved prints in the print-db/lexie directory. The 
filename  5-1-lexie indicates that this pcap is the first sample from implementation-id 5. 
duration-print-matcher mis-identifies this pcap, as the correct implementation is not at the 











./duration-print-matcher -a 00:0A:95:F3:2F:AB -p ./print-db/lexie/pcaps/5-1-lexie.pcap -
P ./print-db/lexie/ 
Table 36.   Sample output from duration-print-matcher 
 
rank score ID Model chipset  
driver 
 
0 79.03 10 Broadcom-MiniPCI BCM4318 bcmwl5.sys 





2 73.51 6 Zonet-ZEW1520 BCM4306 bcmwl5.sys 
3 56.03 7 Intel-IPW220BG IPW2200BG w29n51.sys 
4 54.74 13 Cisco-Aironet-350 Prism2 pcx500.sys 
5 53.06 11 Sony-PSP unknown unknown 
6 47.19 8 D-Link-dwl-g122 RA2570 rt2500usb.sys 















10 38.53 1 Linksys-WPC55AG AR5212 ar5211.sys 
11 28.55 12 Nintendo-DS unknown unknown 
12 22.61 9 SMC-2532W-B Prism2.5 smc2532w.sys 
 
B. DURATION-PRINT-GRADER 
duration-print-grader performs the same analysis as duration-print-matcher, 
however it does it on a much larger scale. Every implementation included in a database 
had 3 different captures taken of it associating to a network.  duration-print-grader takes 
all these pcaps, attempts to match them to the database of prints on disk, and keeps track 
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of the amount of error in terms of distance down the sorted list the correct print for that 
pcap is found.  A table representing the output of duration-print-grader is below. 
 
Table 37.   output from: ./duration-print-grader -P ./print-db/lexie/ 
 
(MediumCompare-Combined against: lexie) 
ID s1 s2 s3 Chipset, driver success rate 




2 0 0 1     Atheros    AR5212      
ntpr11ag.sys 
38/ 39 (0.974) 
 
3 0 0 2     Atheros    AR5211      
ntpr11ag.sys 
37/ 39 (0.949) 
 
4 2 0 0     Atheros    AR5212      
ntpr11ag.sys 
37/ 39 (0.949) 
 
5 1 1 0     Broadcom    BCM4318      
AppleAirport2.kext 
37/ 39 (0.949) 
 
6 0 0 0     Broadcom    BCM4306      
bcmwl5.sys 
39/ 39 (1.000) 
7 0 0 0     Intel  IPW2200BG      
w29n51.sys 
39/ 39 (1.000) 
8 0 0 0     RaLink    RA2570      
rt2500usb.sys 
39/ 39 (1.000) 
9 0 0 0     Intersil   Prism2.5      
smc2532w.sys 
39/ 39 (1.000) 
10 0 0 0     Broadcom    BCM4318      
bcmwl5.sys 
39/ 39 (1.000) 
11 0 0 0    unknown    unknown      
unknown 
39/ 39 (1.000) 
12 0 0 0     unknown    unknown      
unknown 
39/ 39 (1.000) 
13 0 0 0     Intersil    Prism2      pcx500.sys 39/ 39 (1.000) 
--num errors across DB: 7 
success rate across DB: 12.820513 / 13 = 0.9862 
 
Samples s1,s2,s3 refer to the three sample pcaps for a given implementation. The 
first sample in the row for ID 5 corresponds to the previous example from duration-print-
matcher. This has value of 1 because the correct print was 1 deep in the list for sample 1.  
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The column on the right is the success rate of the specified algorithm for a single 
implementation.  It is computed using eq. 5.1, which can be expressed as   
accuracy = (num_implementations_in_db) * (num_samples) −misplacement_distance
(num_implementations_in_db)* (num_samples)
 
where misplacement distance is the sum of the ranks for the three samples For instance, 
for the airport extreme (implementation ID #5) we get the following accuracy: 




= 0.949  
Chapter V covers the details, but by taking the weighted average of these 
individual success rates where the rate is the likelihood of seeing an implementation, we 
can compute a success rate across the entire database. When using duration-print-grader 
the likelihood of seeing an implementation is constant, and the individual success rates 
are all weighted equally. In the example above, the success rate across the database turns 
out to be 12.805555 / 13 = 0.9850. 
63
APPENDIX D.  COMPREHENSIVE DEVICE DRIVER 
INFORMATION 
The following table details all of the 802.11 implementations tested in this study.  
Every implementation excluding the Apple Airport Extreme was test on Windows XP 
SP2. The Airport card was tested on OSX 10.4 
 
Table 38.   Exhaustive 802.11 implementation data 
 








WPC55AG v1.2  
 
Atheros AR5212  
ar5211.sys  
  








Signed: Microsoft Windows 






Silver 8481-WD  
Atheros AR5212  
ntpr11ag.sys  
 
Driver Date: 8/5/2004  
Provider: Atheros 
Communications Inc.  




Signed: Microsoft Windows 






Silver 8461-05  
Atheros AR5211  






Silver 8471-WD  
Atheros AR5212  
same as above   
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Driver Date: 1/23/2004  
Provider: Broadcom.  
File version 3.50.21.10  
Copyright 1998-2003 
Broadcom Corporation.  
Signed: Microsoft Windows 











Driver Date: 9/12/2005  
Provider: intel  
File Version: 9003-9 Driver 
Copyright: Intel 2004  
Signed: Microsoft Windows 









Driver Date: 4/1/2004  
Provider: D-Link/Ralink  
Driver Version: 1.0.0.0  
Signed: Microsoft Windows 









Driver Date: 10/20/2003  
Provider: SMC  
Driver Version: 3.1.3.0  
Copyright: 2003 SMC 
Networks, Inc.  










Driver Date: 12/22/2004  
Provider: Broadcom  
Driver Version: 3.100.46.0 
Copyright: 1998-2004, 
Broadcom Corporation.  
Signed: Microsoft Windows 










Nintendo DS  
unknown NA  
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Driver Provider: Microsoft  
Driver Date: 7/1/2001  
Driver Version: 7.29.0.0  
Digital Signer: Microsoft 















Driver Date: 6/26/2006  
Provider: intel  
File Version: 9.0.4.17 
Copyright: Intel 2004  
Signed: Microsoft Windows 
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